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Towards the end of 2012, the concept of 
‘contractual arrangements’ was presented in the 
four Presidents’ report ‘Towards a genuine Economic 
and Monetary Union’ and in the Commission’s 
blueprint  (under the name of ‘Convergence and 
Competitiveness Instruments’). At this time, this 
kind of contract was presented as a first step 
towards a deeper and more integrated economic 
union (encompassing a ‘fiscal union’) that would 
reinforce the architecture of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) whose weaknesses the 
crisis revealed. Such a contract would bind a 
Member State in adopting structural reforms, 
while some EU financial support may be 
granted to the contracting Member State. They 
would be mutually agreed between the 
Commission and Member States and would 
involve all eurozone Member States, but be 
voluntary for the others. They would aim at 
strengthening the coordination of economic 
policies, notably by increasing the level of 
commitment, ownership and implementation of 
economic policies and  reforms in the eurozone. 
This would in turn ensure the smooth 
functioning of the EMU, in particular by 
avoiding excessive divergences in 
competitiveness among its members.  
More than a year after these early proposals 
were tabled, discussions on the elements of a 
fiscal union were largely sidelined, as the priority 
was given to setting up a Banking Union. Only 
the idea of ‘contractual arrangements’ remained 
on the agenda. One objective of the December 
19-20 European Council will be to define their 
essential features. 
‘Contractual arrangements’ were 
proposed as an initial step towards a 
fiscal union that would consolidate the 
EMU. At this stage, the debate should 
be centred on the cornerstone of these 
contracts: the solidarity mechanism. 
The form of the financial support 
should not be limited to loans, and 
include the possibility for grants. Only 
the countries with the greatest 
adjustment needs should benefit from 
the financial support of other countries. 
This solidarity could be justified in 
principle by the intensity of the ‘shocks’ 
they experienced. In this way, 
contractual arrangement would 
facilitate the completion of the 
necessary adjustment in the current 
crisis – thanks both to more structural 
reforms and more mutual support 
within the eurozone. 
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Expanding on the recommendations formulated 
in the Egmont paper ‘Money for structural reforms in 
the Eurozone: making sense of contractual 
arrangements’, this Policy Brief highlights several 
considerations for the current debate. First, it 
discusses the rationale behind the financial 
support which is both crucial for the 
effectiveness of contractual arrangements and 
the most politically delicate. Secondly, as recent 
discussions have indicated, financial support for 
these arrangements could come in the form of 
loans rather than grants. This brief discusses the 
possible implications of adopting a loan-based 
funding mechanism. Lastly, this brief 
emphasises the positive transformation that 
contractual arrangements could trigger within 
the EU economic governance.  
THE INCENTIVE AND SOLIDARITY 
RATIONALES 
The main justification for associating contractual 
arrangements with some form of financial 
support (a ‘solidarity mechanism’) is that it 
would act as an incentive for the contracting 
Member State. This argument is based on a 
political economy rationale. A government 
would incur a political cost for implementing 
structural reforms. Furthermore these reforms 
may not bring positive results until long after 
their implementation. Some external financial 
incentive would compensate (at least partially) 
for this cost. The politics behind this way of 
thinking may seem quite unethical. Many would 
consider such a financial incentive a ‘bribe’, 
which thus gives them the impression that 
sovereign governments are selling their 
sovereignty to the EU. If that were the case, 
contractual arrangements would be quite 
ineffective in promoting national ownership of 
the suggested reforms.  
The incentive rationale could also be stated 
more simply. A contract necessarily has two 
sides. In the case of a contractual arrangement 
between a eurozone Member State and the EU, 
one side (the Member State) commits to 
structural reforms, while the other side (the 
eurozone as a whole) provides the first side with 
financial support. Without this symmetry, no 
country would voluntarily agree to enter into a 
binding agreement. For this reason, there cannot 
be talks of contractual arrangement without 
some sort of financial support. 
However, there is a much more essential 
dimension to this concept of financial support. 
Intrinsically, the money tied to the contracts 
represents a form of ‘solidarity’ amongst 
Member States as the countries most heavily 
impacted by the financial crisis continue to 
adjust. Discussions on contractual arrangements 
should not lose sight of the fact that these 
contracts would constitute a step towards a 
fiscal union. 
Insurance schemes in a fiscal union: a step 
too far? 
The need for a fiscal union to complement and 
‘complete’ a monetary union is founded on 
textbook discussions on ‘Optimum Currency 
Areas’. When a particular region of the 
monetary union faces an ‘asymmetric economic 
shock’, part of this shock may be ‘absorbed’ by 
some fiscal transfers coming from other regions.  
Another related theoretical justification is that 
economic cycles may differ among regions of 
the monetary union. A common fiscal capacity 
could act as a mutual insurance mechanism to 
absorb shocks and smooth out business cycles –
ensuring economic stability of the union as a 
whole. Such an insurance scheme was put forth 
as a key element of a fiscal union for the EMU. 
Some of the proposals are based on 
unemployment figures, other on output gaps.1 
However, such insurance mechanisms remain 
extremely controversial, and particularly so 
when imbalances across countries are wide – as 
is currently the case in the eurozone. As in any 
insurance mechanism, some moral hazard issues 
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are inevitable.  Automatic transfers may 
discourage the recipient country from 
reforming. For example, a supranational 
unemployment insurance scheme across 
countries may deter Member States from 
reducing labour market rigidities which prevents 
the necessary adjustment to take place in the 
first place. It may also be noted that labour 
systems are too heterogeneous in Europe. As 
for insurance mechanism to smooth out 
business cycles, they rely on output gaps which 
are notoriously difficult to estimate in real time. 
More generally, many would fear these 
supposedly temporary automatic transfers – as 
net beneficiaries change over time – may actually 
become permanent. 
Reluctance can also be explained by considering 
the varying perceptions of the risks these 
insurance schemes are designed to mitigate. An 
insurance mechanism is best put in place under 
a ‘veil of ignorance’, when risks are perceived as 
nearly equal, whose realization is a distant, 
uncertain prospect. In the current situation, risks 
have already materialized as shocks for several 
countries. In this context, unwinding the 
imbalances that accumulated seems a 
prerequisite for setting-up an insurance 
mechanism. 
Contractual arrangements as an 
intermediate step facilitating the adjustment  
Contractual arrangement may offer an 
intermediate solution. If setting-up an insurance 
mechanism is not yet feasible, why not try to 
emulate one and implement it on a smaller scale 
during a transition period? Such an instrument 
would not amount to an insurance mechanism 
and would not imply any automaticity in the 
transfers. There hence should be no concern for 
any moral hazard. Contractual arrangements 
would be designed to speed up not slow down the 
adjustment process – they would be contracts 
not insurance policies. Recipient countries 
would be contractually bound to implement the 
labour market and product market reforms that 
aim to facilitate the adjustment. Since they 
would be based on ad-hoc agreements, there 
would be more control over the direction and 
scope of the money flows (and possibly their 
use). Transfers would be more limited, timely, 
targeted and temporary than those implied in 
automatic insurance schemes. They could range 
between 0.2% and 0.5% of the recipient 
country’s GDP.2 
Many economists prefer to strictly distinguish 
the rationale for contractual arrangement 
(solidarity for structural reforms) from the 
rationale for economic stabilizer schemes 
(solidarity against a shock or cyclical downturn). 
However, that distinction is not so clear-cut. 
The structural reforms themselves should aim to 
facilitate the adjustment after a shock. 
Moreover, the idea that contractual arrangement 
should be ‘preventive’ rather than ‘corrective’ in 
the sense that they should enact reforms that are 
necessary to prevent a future crisis rather than 
address the present one is odd. It seemingly 
ignores the imbalances that have yet to be fully 
addressed in the eurozone. It also implies that all 
eurozone countries should ideally enter into a 
contractual arrangement, which does not seem 
very effective. Some prioritization is indeed 
required in order to ensure that the money goes 
where it will be most effective – toward 
supporting reforms in countries where 
imbalances have proven the most unsustainable 
and where there is the greatest need for 
adjustment.  
Finally, using contractual arrangements as 
discretionary and ad-hoc shock absorption 
instruments does not contradict but rather 
complements the purpose of the Banking 
Union. Restoring normal lending conditions and 
reversing financial fragmentation in the 
eurozone would allow for capital to flow 
‘downhill’ again from creditor to debtor 
countries. By aiming to do so, an effective 
  
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
4 
 
Banking Union should ultimately prove more 
effective in absorbing shocks than any form of 
fiscal transfers within the eurozone. But the 
effective adjustment of countries is certainly 
another precondition for cross-border financial 
flows to resume, and ultimately for restoring 
growth and creating jobs. In prompting the 
necessary reforms, contractual arrangements 
would thus effectively complement the building 
of a Banking Union.  
THE NATURE OF THE SUPPORT: LOANS 
RATHER THAN GRANTS?  
Financial support was originally thought of in 
the form of grants. But grants necessarily imply 
some pooling of common fiscal resources and 
transfers – two aspects are not met with much 
enthusiasm from Member States. Consequently, 
discussions surrounding the form the financial 
support could take was enlarged to the 
possibility of granting loans to the contracting 
Member States3. Countries engaging in a 
contractual arrangement would benefit from 
‘cheap loans’ i.e. they would access loans on 
concessional terms, at lower lower interest rate 
than the prevailing market rate of their own 
national borrowings.  
However, the incentive effect of such loans is 
questionable. Assuming the average funding cost 
of the vehicle used to provide these EU loans 
will be around 2%, only a country whose own 
sovereign borrowing rate is significantly higher 
may find this offer advantageous. Programme 
Countries already benefiting from EFSF/ESM 
loans would most likely be excluded, as long as 
they have not found their way back to the 
market (at this stage: Greece, Ireland, Portugal 
and Cyprus). At this time, the long-term 
borrowing cost of Italy (4.1%), Spain (4.1%) and 
Slovenia (5.9%) would suggest these countries as 
the most likely candidates for requesting such a 
support through a contract. But whether even 
this limited set of potential candidates would 
willingly engage into a contractual arrangement 
remains an open question. 
Moreover, loans would not fit the rationale of 
contractual arrangements being used as an 
intermediary step towards a fiscal union (as 
exposed in the previous section). Such loans risk 
being reduced to little more than a symbolic 
gesture of solidarity. One can only hope this 
signal will be sufficient enough to encourage 
broader ownership of the suggested reforms in 
the eurozone. But this hope probably relies too 
much on the assumption that government are 
willing to undertake structural reforms, and are 
only prevented from doing so because they face 
some vested interests that could be overcome if 
only a contractual arrangement would ease their 
task. 
HOW COULD THE EMU GOVERNANCE 
EVOLVE WITH CONTRACTUAL 
ARRANGEMENTS? 
Beyond the question of the degree of fiscal 
union – and the underlying degree of solidarity – 
that is needed the smooth functioning of the 
EMU lies the question of how contractual 
arrangements would transform the current 
European economic governance. 
Currently, Country Specific Recommendations 
(CSRs) issued during the European Semester 
either have a strict budgetary nature or a broader 
economic nature. Recommendations for labour 
market or product market reforms, which 
represent the main object of the contractual 
arrangement, fit in this second category. Such 
recommendations are based on two broad 
pillars: the Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedure (MIP) and the Europe 2020 
Integrated guidelines for economic and 
employment policies. These Country Specific 
Recommendations are ‘recommendations’ in the 
strict sense. From a legal perspective, they are 
legislative acts that suggest a course of action to 
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the member states without establishing legal 
obligations in that regard.  
Only in cases where an excessive imbalance 
procedure (the corrective arm of the MIP) is 
opened for a country that presents ‘excessive’ 
imbalances can the Commission – as a last 
resort - propose to the Council to impose a 
sanction to this country for failing to sufficiently 
address the issue. But such a ‘stick’ may not be 
very efficient or credible. Can the Commission 
and the Council take such a hard stance against a 
Member State? Can financial sanctions be 
productive during times of economic difficulty? 
It is quite remarkable that the Commission 
chose not to request the opening of the 
excessive imbalance procedure when it finally 
decided to state that Spain and Slovenia 
presented ‘excessive’ macroeconomic 
imbalances in the 2013 cycle of the EU 
semester. This may indicate that the existing 
governance framework which largely relies on 
negative enforcement mechanisms has its limits. 
Because Member States are sovereign on 
national economic policy matters, and because 
sanction mechanisms always raise questions of 
credibility, some recommendations that matter 
for the functioning of the eurozone are 
essentially ignored.  Effectiveness and 
ownership remains low and the EU Semester is 
still a mostly bureaucratic exercise. Contractual 
arrangements precisely intend to increase both 
the effectiveness of EU policy recommendations 
and their ownership at the national level. They 
may do so for two reasons. 
Firstly, contractual arrangement may allow for 
some prioritization across recommendations and 
across countries. Available financial resources 
for the contracts will very likely be limited. 
Financial support will thus have to be granted to 
support the reforms that are the most necessary 
and urgent in the eurozone. The Commission 
will therefore have to indicate for which country 
and for which recommendation a contractual 
arrangement would be desirable. In doing so it 
would suggest the type and scope of financing 
to the Council. The Commission would need to 
justify why addressing these recommendations 
particularly matters for the eurozone as a whole 
– notably by being as specific as possible on the 
potential ‘negative spillovers’ involved by not 
doing the reforms. Only then, can the Member 
State in question willingly propose a draft 
contract with a set of proposed reforms and a 
time-table, based on the suggestion by the 
Commission.  
Secondly, contractual arrangements would add a 
positive incentive (a ‘carrot’) to the existing 
procedures rather than an extra negative 
incentive (a ‘stick') to the existing ones, which 
largely dominate in the EU economic 
governance.  Such an approach could induce a 
more ‘bottom-up’ and positive approach as the 
initiative for reform proposals would emanate 
from the Member States. 
CONCLUSION 
Basically put on hold for a year, the debate on 
the scope of a fiscal union has been resumed 
through the discussions on contractual 
arrangements. The December 19-20 European 
Council should specify their main features. As 
these instruments were initially considered to be 
a first step towards more ambitious schemes for 
a fiscal union, their design will reflect the 
remaining ambition to reach this goal. A central 
feature in this respect will be the scope of the 
solidarity mechanism i.e. the financial support 
that will be attached to the contractual 
arrangement. 
The need for a financial support is supported by 
various rationales for solidarity in the EMU. 
This Policy Brief argued that the transfers 
implied should be considered in relation to the 
automatic absorption/stabilization function of 
more ambitious insurance schemes that were 
proposed for a ‘fiscal union’. However, bound 
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in contractual arrangements, these transfers 
could be more limited, targeted, timely and 
temporary. They would be strongly conditioned 
to the timely implementation of labour market 
reforms and product market reforms, and thus 
designed to facilitate the adjustment of countries 
most affected by imbalances. This rationale 
would underline that contractual arrangement 
would constitute an ‘embryo’ for bolder 
schemes that could be put in place once the 
eurozone imbalances have levelled out. 
Effective contractual arrangements could 
increase the effectiveness of European 
economic governance. This financial instrument 
would introduce a ‘positive’ incentive (‘carrot’) 
in the EU semester which is so far dominated by 
negative incentives (‘sticks’). Since financial 
resources backing the contracts will likely be 
limited, this should trigger prioritization across 
Country Specific Recommendations. The 
Commission would specify for which eurozone 
country and for which recommendation for 
structural reforms a contract would be desirable. 
Then the selected countries would voluntarily 
propose an agenda of reforms for which 
support would be granted. Accordingly, only the 
eurozone countries most seriously affected by 
the crisis will be concerned. 
However, the discussion on contractual 
arrangement now incorporates the idea that 
grants (outright transfers) could be substituted 
by loans. In this case, the incentive to enter into 
a contractual arrangement may wear thin, even 
for eurozone countries now facing the highest 
borrowing costs (Spain, Italy, Slovenia). 
Moreover, the solidarity dimension of the 
financial support would also singularly diminish. 
For these reason, loans may only serve as a 
symbolic gesture of EU solidarity that would – 
one may hope – create ownership for the 
reforms at the national level.  
This seems like wishful thinking.  If contractual 
arrangements represent a step towards bolder 
fiscal union schemes, the European Council 
should be ambitious in setting the key features 
of the solidarity mechanism that will back them. 
Grants should not be excluded at this stage. The 
core principle behind the solidarity mechanism 
should be that it would support the correction 
phase of the current crisis. Failing to attach 
sufficient financing scope to them could bury 
any remaining ambition for a fiscal union for the 
foreseeable future. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 The four Presidents’ report refers to a ‘Shock absorption function’ (Van Rompuy, 2012) and the commission’s 
Blueprint to a ‘stabilisation function’ (European Commission, 2012). For examples of Schemes based on out-put 
gap, see Pisani-Ferry et al (2012) where transfers represent 0.25% of the absolute output gap above a 2% 
threshold and Enderlein et al (2012) where transfers represents 0.5% of relative deviations of output gap relative 
to the euro-area output gap. See Dullien (2013) and Bontout & Lejeune (2013) for discussions on unemployment 
insurance schemes.  
2 See Vanden Bosch (2013) for some simulations for a limited set of countries. 
3 Notably, as in the annotated agenda for the Sherpa meeting on contractual arrangement which has since leaked 
in the press. See http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/files/2013/11/Sherpa.pdf. 
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